ZABUL PROVINCE, Afghanistan — Some commanders call it a "tactical pause" to give time for additional U.S. and allied troops to surge into the country. Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, the operational commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, calls it "repositioning." Others say the reduced "optempo" is just part of a "realignment" necessary to prepare for a major offensive in Kandahar this June. The troops use a different term of art.

"This is b—s—," said one junior officer. He continued, "It’s not the (rules of engagement). None of us has a problem with reducing the incidence of civilian casualties. But we need to stay on the offensive here if we’re going to win." One soldier, after being told to "stand down" just before heading out on a night ambush, said, "We’re being held hostage inside the wire." So it’s apparent that — whatever they’re called — offensive operations have been scaled back. That means Taliban insurgents are getting a breather they don’t deserve.

In interviews with senior officers, I was reminded that Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s "population-centric" counterinsurgency strategy mandates the primary mission of U.S. and allied troops be to protect the civilian population. The soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines with whom I have been embedded — both conventional and special operations troops — don’t object to that goal. But they are complaining they are being restricted from conducting offensive operations against an enemy who will take advantage of the reduced optempo.

South of here in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, the period from mid-April to mid-June is opium-harvesting season. Since 2002, when the Taliban turned to heroin to support their insurgency, it has been a time when "migrant workers" cross the border from Pakistan to work the poppy fields. It is also an opportunity for Taliban leaders to collect their cut of the "opium tax."

Despite Taliban claims to Islamic purity, they collect a tax of 300-400 grams of opium per Jereeb of cultivated poppy-growing land. One Jereeb is 2,000 square meters — about half the size of a U.S. football field. The tax rate is based on the "ushr," a traditional Islamic tax of one-tenth of the produce of agricultural land that in normal times is collected by the neighborhood mosque and redistributed as social welfare to the local needy. It’s an Islamic version of wealth redistribution. The timing of the tax collection is dependent on the local harvest season.

Last summer, plans were drawn up to interdict cross-border "ratlines" as a means of defunding the Taliban. But the Obama administration’s five-month delay in "surging" additional U.S. troops and trainers to Afghanistan has resulted in too few "boots on the ground" to shut down the frontier. As a consequence, the effort to reduce this spring’s opium harvest is being limited to a "test case" in the recently secured Marjah district of central Helmand.

Though the Marjah operation — and parallel efforts by the International Security Assistance Force in Nad Ali, Now Zad and Garmsir — resulted in reduced opium production, the Karzai government in Kabul has been slow to capitalize on the gains elsewhere in the country. Only 27 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces currently have full-time provincial reconstruction teams in operation. Some Afghan national security forces, such as the commando kandaks that are partnered with U.S. special operations units, are well-trained and well-equipped, but many are barely prepared.

Our Fox News team has accompanied more than two dozen combined U.S./Afghan units on combat operations — and seen the full spectrum of the readiness of Afghan security forces. On one such mission last week, U.S. personnel were stunned when the Afghan National Army company commander they had been advising "declined" to board the Mi-17 helicopters carrying his troops on a cordon and search operation.

Perhaps he "stayed home" because he knew his men better than we did. During the mission — led by a capable Afghan sergeant — only a handful of his troops exhibited the slightest tactical proficiency. Carrying their AK-47s slung over their shoulders seemed to be SOP. The platoon’s machine-gunner ditched his Kevlar helmet. In its stead, he wore a white turban around his head. Chuck Holton, my former U.S. Army Ranger cameraman, and I spent the day staying as far from him as we could, knowing he was Target No. 1 for a sniper. Thankfully, the Taliban were out to lunch — or went to ground to prevent being spotted on the thermal sights of the Apache helicopters overhead.

There are some very good, brave and competent Afghan soldiers and police, but not enough. The commandos and narcotics interdiction units we have seen are the kind of troops you want on your flank in a gunfight. Unfortunately, the "tactical pause" now under way in Afghanistan won’t help any of them get any better — or help our troops do what they know they can do: win!